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 1 Introduction
Governments in large countries may distort domestic environmental policy in the presence
of transboundary pollution to reduce carbon leakage, which occurs when strict domestic
pollution policy increases foreign emissions. A change in domestic policy in a large country,
under trade, changes the world price of the pollution intensive good, leading to a change
in production (hence, pollution) in the other country. Rauscher (1997) finds that in large
countries with “substantial leakage effects, optimal environmental policies tend to lead to too
low emission tax rates” when the pure terms of trade effects are small compared to leakage
effects. To the best of our knowledge, in the literature, carbon leakage has only been shown
to occur in large countries under trade as changes in pollution policies in closed or small
open economies do not affect world prices, through which carbon leakage works.
Most papers in the literature on trade and environmental policy1 focus on the policy
choice of large countries (which can influence world prices). Markusen (1975), Copeland
(1996) and Hatzipanayotou et al. (2008) are some of the papers that analyze non-cooperative
pollution policy in small open economies when there is transboundary pollution and coun-
tries set their policies simultaneously. However, it is well known that strategic considerations
come in to effect when policy is set sequentially2. In this note, we consider environmental
policy in neighboring countries that cannot influence world prices and suffer from bilateral
transboundary pollution. To focus on the effect of sequential policy setting on pollution pol-
icy in the presence of a bilateral transboundary externality, we assume that neither country
can manipulate its terms of trade3.
Ba´rcena-Ruiz (2006) analyzes first-mover advantages in setting environmental policy in
the presence of imperfect competition when there is transboundary pollution between two
large policy active countries4. The “rent capture effect” lowers pollution taxes in each
country, while the “sequential setting effect” increases taxes in both countries. He finds
that, when transboundary spillovers are low (high), the leader sets a higher (lower) tax than
the follower. Our analysis departs from the large country assumption of Ba´rcena-Ruiz; hence,
countries have no incentives to distort environmental policy for terms of trade objectives.
Furthermore, in our model, all sectors in both countries are perfectly competitive and there
1See, for instance, Copeland and Taylor (2004) for a comprehensive and critical review of issues related
to trade and the environment.
2See, for example, Tirole (1989) and Gal-Or (1985).
3As Hatzipanayotou et al. (2008) notes, “countries in the European Union or in other RTAs are part of
a much bigger world trading system. Therefore, the assumption regarding the exogeneity of terms of trade
between any two such countries may not be an implausible one”.
4In a similar setting, Kennedy (1994) analyzes strategic interaction between governments that set pollu-
tion taxes simultaneously when there is transboundary pollution and imperfect competition.
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 is no “rent capture” motive.
One can think of bilateral transboundary pollution in terms of water bodies shared be-
tween countries5. Release of eﬄuents in such waters by neighboring countries affects only
these countries, resulting in bilateral transboundary pollution. Such problems have been
observed worldwide, including the well known dispute regarding paper mills set up on the
Uruguay side of the Uruguay river, which resulted in Argentina appealing to the Inter-
national Court of Justice6. Hence, our analysis would be most relevant to these kinds of
transboundary pollution problems.
We find that when the only strategic interaction between countries is via transboundary
pollution and pollution taxes are set simultaneously, there is no carbon leakage. But, in a
sequential-move game there is carbon leakage even if neither country can influence world
goods prices: if the leader sets a high pollution tax, it leads to higher emissions in the
follower, which, in turn, reduces the leader’s welfare via increased incidence of transboundary
pollution. This lowers the leader’s marginal benefit from regulating pollution. The leader’s
pollution tax is lower than that in the simultaneous-move equilibrium and lower than the
marginal damage from own pollution. The only motive behind the leader’s underregulation of
pollution is to reduce carbon leakage. If there is only unidirectional transboundary pollution
flow, carbon leakage does not occur and, the sequential and simultaneous move equilibria
coincide. Moreover, if pollution is a pure global public bad, then aggregate pollution is
higher in the sequential-move game than in the simultaneous-move game.
In the next section, we present the model, derive efficient pollution taxes and non-
cooperative taxes under simultaneous-move. Section 3 analyzes the sequential-move game.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
We consider two neighboring countries, home and foreign countries (foreign variables are
denoted using a ∗) affected by bilateral transboundary pollution. The rest of the world
(assumed not to behave strategically) does not generate pollution that affects these countries
nor is it affected by pollution from the latter; pollution in water bodies shared between
countries would be such a case. There are two goods (X, Y ) that are produced under
5The Great Lakes shared between the United States and Canada, Lake Albert between Uganda and the
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Lake Constance bordered by Austria, Germany and Switzerland are
a few examples. Many rivers flow across different countries, for instance, the Ganges through India and
Bangladesh, the Indus through India and Pakistan, the Nile through Egypt and Sudan, and the Uruguay
river forms the border between Argentina and Uruguay.
6Some other examples of transboundary water pollution include Lake Titicaca shared by Bolivia and
Peru, and Lake Peipsi between Estonia and Russia.
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 perfectly competitive conditions and consumed in these two countries.
Home and foreign feasible production sets are, respectively,
g(x, y, z;
−→
V ) ≤ 0 and g∗(x∗, y∗, z∗;−→V ∗) ≤ 0; gx, gy, g∗x∗ , g∗y∗ ≥ 0 > gz, gvi , g∗z∗ , g∗v∗i ,
where z (z∗) is home (foreign) emission and
−→
V (
−→
V ∗) is the home (foreign) country’s factor
endowment vector. This specification nests the case in which pollution is generated as a
by-product of production of either or both goods. It also allows for substitutability between
inputs that can reduce emissions, the possibility of abatement and having polluting as well
as non-polluting inputs.
Preferences of the representative agent in the home and foreign countries are, respectively,
U(cx, cy, z, z
∗) = ψ(cx, cy)− φ(z, z∗;α) and U∗(c∗x, c∗y, z∗, z) = ψ∗(c∗x, c∗y)− φ∗(z∗, z; β),
where cx(c
∗
x) and cy(c
∗
y) denote consumption of X and Y in the home (foreign) country;
ψ(.) and ψ∗(.) are twice differentiable and concave. Pollution damage functions in both
countries, φ(.) and φ∗(.), are strictly convex in emissions and the marginal damage in each
country is increasing in emissions of either country. Hence, φz, φz∗ , φzz, φzz∗ , φz∗z∗ > 0 and
φ∗z∗ , φ
∗
z, φ
∗
z∗z∗ , φ
∗
zz∗ , φ
∗
zz > 0; α and β are shift parameters that will be used later
7. Further-
more, the marginal damage from own pollution is at least as high as that from transboundary
pollution in both countries, i.e., φz ≥ φz∗ and φ∗z∗ ≥ φ∗z. A pollution damage function, com-
monly used in the literature, that satisfies the above properties is φ(z, z∗) = η
2
(z + λz∗)2,
η > 0, λ ≤ 1.
Suppose that both countries use taxes on own emissions, tˆ and tˆ∗, which are the only
policy instruments available, to regulate pollution. Let Y be the numeraire good, i.e., set
the price of Y , py ≡ 1, and denote the price of X as p. The GNP functions for the home
and foreign countries are8, respectively,
R(p, tˆ) and R∗(p∗, tˆ∗).
Home and foreign expenditure functions are9, respectively,
e(p, u+ φ(z, z∗)) and e∗(p∗, u∗ + φ∗(z, z∗)).
7We suppress these notations, α and β, and use them only when required for future analysis.
8The GNP function is given by R(p, tˆ) = maxx,y,z{px + y − tˆz} such that g(x, y, z;−→V ) ≤ 0. Standard
envelope properties of this function imply Rtˆ = −z and Rtˆtˆ = −ztˆ.
9Due to the presence of the externality, the expenditure function is given by: mincx,cy (pcx +
cy) s.t. ψ(cx, cy)− φ(z, z∗) ≥ u⇒ mincx,cy (pcx + cy) s.t. ψ(cx, cy) ≥ u+ φ(z, z∗).
3
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 The resource constraints for the home and foreign countries are, respectively,
e(p, u+ φ(z, z∗)) = R(p, tˆ) + tˆz (1)
and e∗(p∗, u∗ + φ∗(z, z∗)) = R∗(p∗, tˆ∗) + tˆ∗z∗, (2)
where we have assumed that all tax revenues are rebated back lump-sum to the consumers.
Differentiating eq. (1) with respect to tˆ, we get the best response function of the home
country as a function of the foreign country’s tax:
eu
du
dtˆ
= (Rp − ep)dp
dtˆ
+ (tˆ− euφz)dz
dtˆ
− euφz∗ dz
∗
dtˆ
. (3)
The first term reflects the terms of trade effect; it depends on the relative pollution intensity
of X and the direction of trade. The second term is the welfare effect of a change in tˆ via
change in domestic emissions. The last term reflects the role of carbon leakage, which can
occur through a change in the world price of the pollution intensive good due to a change in
the home country’s pollution tax; this occurs if countries are economically interdependent
and the world prices of goods are endogenous10. Carbon leakage can also occur if foreign
pollution changes due to a change in marginal damage from own pollution in the foreign
country as the home country’s pollution tax changes. This latter channel is the only driving
force in our model, as will be clear later. The foreign country’s best response function as a
function of the home country’s tax is
e∗u∗
du∗
dtˆ∗
= (R∗p∗ − e∗p∗)
dp∗
dtˆ∗
+ (tˆ∗ − e∗u∗φ∗z∗)
dz∗
dtˆ∗
− e∗u∗φ∗z
dz
dtˆ∗
. (4)
Assumption. Both home and foreign countries are small open economies and hence dp
dtˆ
=
dp∗
dtˆ∗ = 0 {or, alternatively, both are closed economies and hence Rp = ep and R∗p∗ = e∗p∗}.
This implies that there is no terms of trade effect ; hence, the only strategic interaction
between countries is through transboundary pollution11. Eqs. (3) and (4) imply that, in the
absence of transboundary pollution, the optimal home and foreign taxes are, respectively,
t¯ = euφz(z, z
∗) and t¯∗ = e∗u∗φ
∗
z∗(z, z
∗), (5)
10See, among others, Rauscher (1997) and Lapan and Sikdar (2010).
11Kiyono and Okuno-Fujiwara (2003) also consider a model where the only interaction between two closed
economies is through “global warming”, but governments set environmental policy simultaneously, although
firms may move second to make production decisions.
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 i.e., each country sets its emission tax equal to its own marginal damage and this is Pareto
efficient since there is no transboundary externality. Hereafter, we explicitly assume trans-
boundary pollution occurs.
Pareto Efficient Taxes. The Pareto efficient pollution taxes12 in the home and foreign
countries are, respectively,
te = euφz + e
∗
u∗φ
∗
z and t
e∗ = e∗u∗φ
∗
z∗ + euφz∗ , (6)
i.e., the efficient pollution tax equals the sum of marginal damages in the two countries.
Hence, efficiency requires that both countries internalize the domestic and transboundary
effects of their emissions.
Simultaneous-Move Pollution Taxes. When countries set taxes simultaneously and non-
cooperatively, since dz
∗
dtˆ
= dz
dtˆ∗ = 0, eqs. (3) and (4) imply that the optimal pollution taxes
are
tˆ = euφz(z, z
∗) and tˆ∗ = e∗u∗φ
∗
z∗(z, z
∗). (7)
There is no strategic interaction in the simultaneous-move game and each country sets its
pollution tax equal to the marginal damage from its own pollution. Comparing eqs. (6) and
(7), it is clear that in the simultaneous-move game, the pollution taxes, although optimal
from each country’s perspective, are inefficient from the global perspective as countries do
not internalize the transboundary effects of their emissions.
3 Sequential-Move Pollution Taxes
We now consider the case where the home country moves first; denote the home and foreign
taxes in the sequential-move game by t and t∗, respectively. The foreign country (follower)
still sets its tax equal to the marginal damage from its own emissions (since dz
dt∗ = 0):
du∗
dt∗
= 0⇒ J∗(t∗, t, β) = t∗ − e∗u∗φ∗z∗(z∗(t∗), z(t), β) = 0. (8)
However, now the leader (home country) can influence foreign emissions by strategic choice
of its pollution tax, i.e., dz
∗
dt
6= 0. Since z = −Rt and z∗ = −R∗t∗ , we have
dz
dt
= −Rtt and dz
∗
dt
=
dz∗
dt∗
dt∗
dt
= −R∗t∗t∗
(
dt∗
dt
)
. (9)
12These are obtained by solving a social planner’s problem that maximizes one country’s welfare subject
to meeting a certain utility target for the other country.
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 We make the simplifying assumption that e∗u∗u∗ = 0, i.e., the marginal utility of income is
constant. Differentiating eq. (8) w.r.t. t, we have, using eq. (9),
dt∗
dt
=
−J∗t (t∗, t, β)
J∗t∗(t∗, t, β)
=
−e∗u∗φ∗z∗zRtt
1 + e∗u∗φ
∗
z∗z∗R
∗
t∗t∗
< 0, (10)
i.e., the foreign country’s pollution tax is decreasing in the home country’s pollution tax;
this is carbon leakage at work. Using eqs. (9) and (10), we have
dz∗
dt
=
e∗u∗φ
∗
z∗zRttR
∗
t∗t∗
1 + e∗u∗φ
∗
z∗z∗R
∗
t∗t∗
> 0, (11)
and
dz∗
dz
=
dz∗
dt
dt
dz
=
−e∗u∗φ∗z∗zR∗t∗t∗
1 + e∗u∗φ
∗
z∗z∗R
∗
t∗t∗
∈ (−1, 0). (12)
Hence, foreign pollution increases as the home pollution tax increases. This increased in-
flow of transboundary pollution due to carbon leakage reduces the home country’s marginal
benefit from regulating its own pollution. Eq. (12) basically implies that home and foreign
pollution are strategic substitutes. The home country’s best response function, eq. (3),
implies:
du
dt
= 0⇒ K(t, t∗, α) = (t− euφz)− δseuφz∗R
∗
t∗t∗
Rtt
dt∗
dt
= (t− euφz) + δseuφz∗R
∗
t∗t∗
Rtt
J∗t
J∗t∗
, (13)
where δs = 0 in the simultaneous-move game and δs = 1 in the sequential-move game (when
the home country moves first). The solution for the simultaneous-move game, tˆ and tˆ∗, comes
from solving eqs. (8) and (13), assuming δs = 0. On the other hand, in the sequential-move
game, the solution, t and t∗, comes from solving eqs. (8) and (13), assuming δs = 1. The
optimal pollution tax for the home country (leader) is:
t = euφz − eu︸︷︷︸
>0
φz∗︸︷︷︸
>0

>0︷︸︸︷
e∗u∗
>0︷︸︸︷
φ∗z∗z
>0︷︸︸︷
R∗t∗t∗
1 + e∗u∗︸︷︷︸
>0
φ∗z∗z∗︸︷︷︸
>0
R∗t∗t∗︸︷︷︸
>0
 = euφz
1 + e∗u∗R∗t∗t∗
{
1− φz∗φ∗z∗z
φzφ∗z∗z∗
}
φ∗z∗z∗
1 + e∗u∗φ
∗
z∗z∗R
∗
t∗t∗
 .
(14)
Pollution taxes under simultaneous and sequential moves can be compared as follows:
Proposition 1. When countries that cannot influence world prices and are affected by bilat-
eral transboundary pollution set pollution taxes sequentially, the leader underregulates pollu-
tion as compared to the simultaneous-move game, i.e., t < tˆ, and sets its pollution tax lower
than the marginal damage from own pollution, i.e., t < euφz. The follower sets its pollution
tax higher than that in the simultaneous-move game, i.e., t∗ > tˆ∗.
6
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 Proof. Using eq. (8), define the foreign country’s reaction function as t∗ = B(t, β); eq. (10)
implies dt
∗
dt
= Bt < 0. Substituting the reaction function in eq. (13), define (since δs = 1):
du
dt
= 0⇒ L(t, β, α) ≡ K(t, t∗(t, β), α) = t− euφz + R
∗
t∗t∗
Rtt
J∗t
J∗t∗
= 0. (15)
The second order conditions imply dL
dt
> 0. Furthermore, evaluating the above equation at
t = tˆ we have t∗(t) = tˆ∗; hence, L(tˆ) > 0. Given Lt(.) > 0, this implies that the optimal
solution t < tˆ. Finally, the negative slope of the foreign country’s reaction function implies
that t∗ > tˆ∗. Q.E.D.
As the leader’s emissions increase (z
x), the follower’s marginal damage from own pollu-
tion also increases (φ∗z∗
x since φ∗z∗z > 0). This prompts lower foreign emissions (and a higher
foreign pollution tax), which reduces the incidence of transboundary pollution in the leader.
Moreover, assuming symmetry13, from Proposition 1, we have
Lemma 1. If countries are symmetric, the leader sets a lower pollution tax than the follower.
If pollution is a pure global public bad, i.e., in both countries, the marginal damage from
own pollution is positive and the same as that from the incidence of transboundary pollution,
then φz = φz∗ and φ
∗
z = φ
∗
z∗ , which implies φ
∗
zz∗ = φ
∗
z∗z∗ . Hence, from eq. (14) we have
t =
euφz
1 + e∗u∗φ
∗
z∗z∗R
∗
t∗t∗
∈ (0, tˆ ), i.e.,
Lemma 2. If pollution is a pure global public bad, then the leader’s pollution tax is always
positive.
Eq. (14) also implies that, if φz∗ = 0 or φ
∗
z∗z = 0, then t = euφz, i.e., the simultaneous-
move and sequential-move equilibria are the same and the leader also sets its tax equal to
the marginal damage from own pollution. If transboundary pollution is unidirectional14,
i.e., if φz∗ = 0 or φ
∗
z = 0, this condition is satisfied. φz∗ = 0 implies that the leader is not
affected by foreign pollution. Since the only incentive behind the underregulation of pol-
lution is to reduce the inflow of transboundary pollution, in the absence of transboundary
pollution, the leader does not have any incentive to distort domestic environmental policy.
If φ∗z = 0, the follower is not affected by leader’s pollution; hence, the leader cannot influence
foreign pollution by strategically underregulating its own pollution. Since the only strategic
13Symmetry implies that both countries have the same preferences and technology.
14Transboundary pollution may be unidirectional if one country is upstream while the other is downstream
along a river. For instance, the Ganges flows from India to Bangladesh, the Indus flows from India to
Pakistan, and the Nile flows North from Sudan to Egypt.
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 interaction between countries is through transboundary pollution, in the absence of bilateral
transboundary pollution, both countries set pollution taxes equal to the marginal damage
from own pollution. Even in the presence of bilateral transboundary pollution, if the fol-
lower’s marginal damage from own pollution does not change with the leader’s pollution
level15, i.e., if φ∗z∗z = 0, then the leader is unable to influence the follower’s pollution by
strategically choosing a lower pollution tax. Thus, the leader sets its pollution tax equal
to the marginal damage from own pollution. We summarize these results in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. When countries set domestic environmental policies sequentially, the equi-
librium coincides with the simultaneous-move equilibrium and both the leader and follower
set their pollution taxes equal to the respective marginal damages from own pollution if either
of the following holds:
 at least one of the countries does not suffer from transboundary pollution, i.e., trans-
boundary pollution is either unidirectional or does not occur;
 the follower’s marginal damage from own pollution is not affected by the leader’s pol-
lution level.
The home country’s optimal pollution tax, t(α, β) is determined from eq. (15), which
can be written as:
L(t, β, α) = t−euφz+euφz∗
(
e∗u∗φ
∗
z∗zR
∗
t∗t∗
1 + e∗u∗φ
∗
z∗z∗R
∗
t∗t∗
)
= φz
{
t
φz
− eu + euφz∗
φz
[
e∗u∗φ
∗
z∗zR
∗
t∗t∗
1 + e∗u∗φ
∗
z∗z∗R
∗
t∗t∗
]}
= 0.
(16)
The last term [. . .] in the eq. (16) is independent of α. Hence,
Proposition 3. When counties set pollution taxes sequentially,
1. a shift in the leader’s pollution damage function, i.e., a change in α, such that ∂(φz∗/φz)
∂α
>
0 will reduce the maximizing ratio of the leader’s tax rate to marginal damage from own
emissions, i.e., ∂(t/φz)
∂α
< 0;
2. a shift in the leader’s pollution damage function, such that ∂φz
∂α
= 0 < ∂φz∗
∂α
will reduce
the leader’s optimal tax rate.
Proof. Both results follow directly from the home country’s second order condition.Q.E.D.
15The pollution damage function φ∗(z, z∗) = η(z∗ + λz), η, λ > 0 satisfies this property.
8
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 Intuitively, an increase in the ratio of marginal damage from transboundary pollution
to that from own pollution16 reduces the leader’s ratio of tax rate to own marginal damage
because it increases the leader’s incentive to underregulate own pollution to reduce the
incidence of transboundary pollution.
Finally, we compare total pollution in the sequential and simultaneous move games.
Proposition 4. If pollution is a pure global public bad, then aggregate pollution is higher in
the sequential-move game than that in the simultaneous-move game.
Proof. From Proposition 1, we have t∗ > tˆ∗, i.e., e∗u∗φ
∗
z∗(z + z
∗) > e∗u∗φ
∗
z∗(zˆ + zˆ
∗). Hence,
strict convexity of the pollution damage function implies (z + z∗) > (zˆ + zˆ∗). Q.E.D.
Thus, when the externality is of a pure public bad nature, setting policies sequentially
leads to higher aggregate pollution than setting policies simultaneously.
4 Concluding Remarks
Pollution in lakes and rivers shared between countries is a common type of transbound-
ary pollution problem. We analyzed non-cooperative environmental policy between such
countries when the only strategic interaction is through transboundary pollution, i.e., the
countries are closed or small open economies. We find that when pollution taxes are set
sequentially, the leader (follower) sets a lower (higher) pollution tax and total pollution
may be higher as compared to the simultaneous-move game. The only motive behind the
leader’s underregulation of pollution is to induce the follower to set a higher pollution tax
and thereby reduce the inflow of transboundary pollution from the follower, i.e., to reduce
carbon leakage. Our analysis points out the possibility of carbon leakage even when countries
are not large, i.e., they cannot influence world goods prices. An important policy implication
of our analysis is the importance of involving all countries, large or small, in environmental
agreements since sequential policy setting may lead to higher aggregate pollution.
16Pollution damage functions of the form: φ(.) = γ(z + αz∗)2 and φ(.) = µ(z + αz∗) + γ(z + z∗)2 would
be examples for Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
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